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THE YALE LAW JOURNAL FORUM
NOVEMBER 6, 2019

An Intersectional Critique of Tiers of Scrutiny:
Beyond “Either/Or” Approaches to Equal Protection
Devon W. Carbado & Kimberlé W. Crenshaw
abstract. For the past forty years, Justice Powell’s concurring opinion in University of California v. Bakke has been at the center of scholarly debates about affirmative action. Notwithstanding the enormous attention Justice Powell’s concurrence has received, scholars have paid little attention to a passage in that opinion that expressly takes up the issue of gender. Drawing on the
theory of intersectionality, this Essay explains several ways in which its reasoning is ﬂawed. The
Essay also shows how interrogating Justice Powell’s “single axis” race and gender analysis raises
broader questions about tiers of scrutiny for Black women. Through a hypothetical of a university’s
affirmative-action plan that speciﬁcally targets Black women, the Essay considers what tier of scrutiny should apply. Because, for the most part, scholars take a race or gender approach to equalprotection law, they have not engaged that doctrinal puzzle and its implications for tiers-of-scrutiny writ large.
introduction
For the past forty years, affirmative action has been one of the most hotly
contested constitutional issues. The literature on the policy is voluminous.1 Perhaps unsurprisingly, much of that literature references, if not fully engages, University of California v. Bakke.2 In that case, Justice Powell’s concurring opinion
expressed three critical ideas: (1) that affirmative-action policies warrant the

1.
2.

For example, the HeinOnline Database displays 170,587 search results discussing “constitutional law” and “affirmative action.”
For example, the HeinOnline Database displays 9,048 search results discussing “Bakke” and
“affirmative action.”
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highest level of judicial review (strict scrutiny);3 (2) that diversity can serve as a
“compelling state interest” for the policy;4 and (3) that colleges and universities
may employ race as “one factor, among many” (but not as quotas) in deciding
which students to admit.5 A majority of the Supreme Court would subsequently
endorse Justice Powell’s constitutional approach to affirmative action.6 And that
approach continues to set the stage on which scholars rehearse their arguments
for and against the policy.
Notwithstanding the enormous attention Justice Powell’s concurrence has
received, scholars have paid little attention to a passage in it that expressly takes
up the issue of gender.7 Drawing on the theory of intersectionality, we engage
that passage, explain several ways in which its reasoning is ﬂawed, and employ
that analysis to articulate a more general critique of Equal Protection’s tiers of
scrutiny.
Our intersectional reading of Bakke is timely for at least four reasons. First,
last year marked the case’s fortieth anniversary, and this year is the thirtieth anniversary of the theory of intersectionality. One of us introduced that theory in a
1989 article titled Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics.8
Like the literature on Bakke, the literature of intersectionality is similarly wideranging. Indeed, since the publication of Demarginalizing, actors across different
contexts, disciplines, and organizations have employed intersectionality to inform their approaches to and critiques of knowledge production and epistemology, community organizing and political advocacy, and litigation and legal
3.

4.
5.
6.
7.

8.

Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290-91 (1978). But see Luke Charles Harris,
Rethinking the Terms of the Affirmative Action Debate Established in the Regents of the University
of California v. Bakke Decision, 6 RES. POL. & SOC’Y 133, 144-47 (1999) (noting that a neglected
footnote in Justice Powell’s concurrence—footnote 43—suggests that affirmative action
should not be framed as a preference, and thus may not warrant the application of strict scrutiny, if the policy counteracts biases in testing regimes or offsets the poor predictive validity
of such tests). For a more extensive look at footnote 43, see Devon W. Carbado, Footnote 43:
Recovering Justice Powell’s Anti-Preference Framing of Affirmative Action, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
(forthcoming 2019).
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314-15.
Id. at 406-07 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 341 (2003).
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 303. We could ﬁnd only ﬁfty-nine articles that even reference the passage,
and none took up the question we raise here. Casebooks have similarly neglected this question. For a notable exception, see CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY 511 (3d ed. 2016)
(expressly questioning the appropriate standard of review for remedial efforts that target
women of color).
Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique
of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139,
166-67 [hereinafter Crenshaw, Demarginalizing].

109

the yale law journal forum

November 6, 2019

reform initiatives.9 Despite the breadth and depth of the literatures on intersectionality and affirmative action, intersectionality has not ﬁgured as an important
framework in debates over affirmative action, and affirmative action has not ﬁgured prominently in discourse about intersectionality. This Essay stages a long
overdue interface.
Second, a central intervention Demarginalizing performed was to demonstrate how “single-axis” race-or-gender approaches to antidiscrimination law
created hidden baselines against which courts framed Black10 women’s allegations of discrimination as extraordinary, preferential, and unfeasible. This Essay
employs Bakke as a point of departure to illustrate how these baseline and representational problems are present in antidiscrimination law more broadly, including in Equal Protection’s tiers-of-scrutiny regime.
Third, our intersectional analysis of tiers of scrutiny broadens the normative,
analytical, and doctrinal terms on which scholars have contested that framework.11 Absent from existing critiques is the view that tiers of scrutiny constitutionally embody a “single-axis” race-or-gender logic.12 This either/or logic becomes readily apparent upon asking which tier of scrutiny is applicable to
remedial projects that target Black women. Intermediate scrutiny because they
are women?13 Strict scrutiny because they are Black?14 Or “strict-scrutiny-plus,”
because as Black women they occupy two classiﬁcations to which heightened
scrutiny typically applies?
To tiers-of-scrutiny enthusiasts, the dilemma we pose may seem to encourage the simple-enough task of generating a coherent justiﬁcation for one tier or
another. And to some extent, we do approach the matter as a doctrinal puzzle in
that we offer a provisional argument within the tiers-of-scrutiny universe for
reviewing remedial efforts that address particular intersectional dilemmas. At
the same time, we share the sense of many skeptics of current equal-protection
9.

10.

11.

12.
13.
14.

For volumes exploring the interdisciplinary and transnational reach of intersectionality, see
Devon W. Carbado, Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Vickie M. Mays & Barbara Tomlinson, Intersectionality: Mapping the Movements of a Theory, 10 DU BOIS REV. 303 (2013); and Sumi Cho,
Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw & Leslie McCall, Toward a Field of Intersectional Studies: Theory,
Applications, and Praxis, 38 SIGNS 785 (2013).
For an explanation for why we capitalize “Black,” see Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV.
L. REV. 1331, 1332 n.2 (1988).
See, e.g., Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 554-57 (2004)
(calling for a single tier of review for all equal-protection claims); Reva Siegel, Why Equal
Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L.
REV. 1111, 1119-29 (1997).
Degraffenreid v. Gen. Motors, 413 F. Supp. 142 (E.D. Mo. 1976).
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976).
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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doctrine who argue that the tiers have become fossilized commitments of a bygone era.15 We should be clear to note, then, that we are neither embracing the
overall tiers-of-scrutiny framework nor proposing “a tier of one’s own” for Black
women. Our more fundamental goal is to draw attention to and disrupt the racialized baselines that have grounded gender-based intermediate scrutiny and
have made Black women’s remedial status in equal-protection law more suspect
than white women’s.
Finally, our foregrounding of Black women in our intersectional analysis of
Bakke and tiers of scrutiny provides an important window into how, historically,
courts have marginalized Black women’s identity and experiences, and into the
presumptively neutral baselines that underwrite antidiscrimination law. Although rarely noted, the suspect status of Black women’s antidiscrimination lawsuits contrasts dramatically with the presumptive cognizability of the white male
subjects of “reverse discrimination” claims. As ﬁrst observed in Demarginalizing,
the same questions that courts have raised about the scope of Title VII’s antidiscrimination mandate, and that we have raised about tiers of scrutiny, could be
raised with reference to white men. As best we can tell, nowhere have courts
worried aloud that permitting white men to bring compound “reverse discrimination” claims would be preferential treatment, open a Pandora’s Box, or raise
questions of plaintiffs’ representativeness on the view that white men are “only”
white men so cannot adequately represent all white people and in particular
white women.16 Because courts have not subjected white men’s “reverse discrimination” lawsuits to a compound discrimination analysis, those lawsuits have not
engendered the same kinds of prohibitory responses as Black women’s lawsuits.
Though we develop our claim about white men’s standing in antidiscrimination
law elsewhere,17 we note here that the both/and representational capital that
15.

We should be clear at this point that our intermediate-scrutiny analysis is not situated within
the Supreme Court’s formalistic classiﬁcation approach. Race and gender projects that subordinate individuals, or groups, or that completely exclude members of any sex or any race,
should be subject to a more heightened standard of review.
16. See Crenshaw, Demarginalizing, supra note 8, at 142-43 n.12 (citing DeGraffenreid, 413 F. Supp.
at 145).
17. This Essay is part of a larger work in progress, in which we seek to mobilize intersectionality
to demonstrate how the representational capital white men have in antidiscrimination law is
part of a broader dynamic through which colorblindness privileges white people. See Devon
W. Carbado, Colorblind Intersectionality, 38 SIGNS 811 (2013) (linking intersectionality to critiques of colorblindness); see also Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, Close Encounters of Three Kinds: On
Teaching Dominance Feminism and Intersectionality, 46 TULSA L. REV. 151 (2010) (framing intersectionality as an engagement with sameness and difference). This Essay tells only one dimension of that story—namely, how across antidiscrimination law, the baselining of whiteness has made white women’s gender-discrimination claims more readily cognizable and less
suspect than Black women’s claims. In highlighting this intragender difference, we do not
mean to discount the importance of sexual orientation or other lines of marginalization, but
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white men possess in antidiscrimination law is precisely what Black women have
struggled to acquire: the standing to frame their injury as representative of the
general (for example, as women) or of the particular (for example, as Black
women). The remainder of our argument proceeds as follows.
Part I ﬁrst revisits Demarginalizing to foreground the emergence of intersectionality as a prism to analyze both the erasure of Black women’s claims of compound discrimination and courts’ refusal to designate them as class representatives in race- and gender-discrimination cases. Underlying these decisions were
baselines of whiteness that narrowed the parameters of race and gender discrimination and positioned Black women’s petitions for antidiscrimination protection as demands for preferential treatment. After laying this theoretical foundation, Part I then turns to Justice Powell’s passage on gender. In explaining the
ﬂaws in Justice Powell’s reasoning, we highlight the various intersectional obfuscations on which it rests. In particular, we show how his installation of white
women as the baseline for articulating the boundaries of intermediate scrutiny is
analogous to the Title VII sex-discrimination cases Demarginalizing discussed.
Part II interrogates the tiers-of-scrutiny framework more generally. Our
overarching claim is that this framework is a “single-axis” juridical structure,
rooted in the either/or approach to antidiscrimination law that Demarginalizing
identiﬁed. Part II contends that this race or gender or (more recently) sexualorientation approach sits in tension with a basic intersectionality insight—that
because of the intersectional dimensions of power, people live their lives coour interest in this Essay is to highlight a set of race and gender logics that animate Justice
Powell’s Bakke concurrence and shape other antidiscrimination regimes, including tiers of
scrutiny. Nor in highlighting white women’s privileged position are we saying that antidiscrimination law offers them robust protections. It does not—and historically has not. We
simply mean to show how whiteness operates across different social categories (including
gender) to privilege antidiscrimination claimants who are white. See Cheryl I. Harris & Kimberly West-Faulcon, Reading Ricci: Whitening Discrimination, Racing Test Fairness, 58 UCLA
L. REV. 73 (2010).
Two more caveats are necessary. First, we have focused on Black women, rather than
women of color generally, because Black women were the litigants in the cases in which intersectionality was initially deployed to contest, and which we revisit here. Moreover, Black people have long been regarded as the quintessential beneﬁciaries of affirmative action. See Luke
Charles Harris & Uma Narayan, Affirmative Action and the Myth of Preferential Treatment: A
Transformative Critique of the Terms of the Affirmative Action Debate, 11 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J.
1, 3 (1994). This framing is so pervasive that even Bakke used the trope of unqualiﬁed beneﬁciaries as African American, even though most beneﬁciaries were Asian and Latino. Finally,
we recognize that this Essay’s analysis implicates Black men, particularly because antiracist
discourse supports the mistaken impression that Black women are socioeconomically secure,
or that their socioeconomic insecurity is secondary to the interests of Black men. See Kimberlé
W. Crenshaw, From Private Violence to Mass Incarceration: Thinking Intersectionally about
Women, Race, and Social Control, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1418, 1457, 1462-70 (2012) [hereinafter
Crenshaw, From Private Violence]. We will take up this issue in subsequent work.
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constitutively as “both/and,” rather than fragmentarily as “either/or.” Part II further maintains that the “either/or” approach to equal-protection doctrine limits
remedial opportunities for Black people not only under strict scrutiny, but under
intermediate scrutiny and rational-basis review as well. This remedial disadvantage derives from the fact that, on one conventional interpretation of equalprotection doctrine, the intersection of race with any other identity triggers strict
scrutiny. Under this view, were an institution to adopt an affirmative-action plan
focused squarely on race and gender, courts should subject it to strict scrutiny,
not intermediate scrutiny. Similarly, an affirmative-action plan focused on race
and sexual orientation should be subjected to strict scrutiny, not rational-basis
review. The distributional effect of this race-plus-anything-triggers-strict-scrutiny vision of equal-protection doctrine is that affirmative-action plans that are
expressly intersectional, and therefore likely to beneﬁt African Americans who
are women and/or members of the LGBTQ community, are precisely the ones
to which courts may apply strict scrutiny. On the ﬂip side, courts would not subject colorblind affirmative-action plans, which target women or the LGBTQ
community and are likely to beneﬁt members of those groups who are white, to
strict scrutiny. While courts would treat such colorblind initiatives as presumptively race-neutral and likely ﬁnd them constitutional, remedial efforts to counteract their exclusionary or disparate impact would face a nearly impassable constitutional barrier. Understood in this way, Part II’s intersectional analysis of
tiers of scrutiny is a concrete example of how baselines of whiteness can, under
the guise of race neutrality, circumscribe remedial possibilities for African Americans.
i. black women, title vii, and colorblind
intersectionality
A. An Intersectional Reading of DeGraffenreid v. General Motors
One of Demarginalizing’s central observations is that in the 1970s and 1980s,
courts denied Black women the opportunity to articulate their claims not only as
Black women, but as women generally. When Black women demanded protection against what they claimed was compound discrimination, some courts responded that recognizing such claims would treat Black women preferentially.
When Black women asserted their claims as women, some courts responded that
Black women were too different to represent all women. One of the cases that
demonstrated this marginalization of Black women in antidiscrimination law
was DeGraffenreid v. General Motors.18
18.

413 F. Supp. 142 (E.D. Mo. 1976).
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In DeGraffenreid, Black women brought a discrimination claim under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The women alleged that General Motors had
discriminated against them on the basis of both their race and sex. The district
court roundly rejected their claim, reasoning that
plaintiffs have failed to cite any decisions which have stated that [B]lack
women are a special class to be protected from discrimination. The
Court’s own research has failed to disclose such a decision. The plaintiffs
are clearly entitled to a remedy if they have been discriminated against.
However, they should not be allowed to combine statutory remedies to
create a new “super-remedy” which would give them relief beyond what
the drafters of the relevant statutes intended. Thus, this lawsuit must be
examined to see if it states a cause of action for race discrimination, sex
discrimination, or alternatively either, but not a combination of both.19
The court then proceeded to perform that “single-axis”20 (race or sex) analysis to ascertain whether the plaintiffs could establish a separate cause of action
for sexism or for racism. With respect to sexism, the court maintained that there
was no evidence of sex discrimination because General Motors hired white
women during the period in which Black women claimed the company had discriminated against them.21 The court’s conclusion seemed to be premised on the
assumption that for an institution to run afoul of Title VII, it would have to treat
all women the same. Under this reasoning, the fact that General Motors hired
white women negated Black women’s allegations of sexism.
The deployment of General Motors’ history of hiring white women to negate
the possibility that it discriminated against Black women was not just an evidentiary move. It was a conceptual one that made white women’s experiences the
relevant baseline against which the cognizability of sex-discrimination claims
was determined. This framed Black women, but not white women, as gendered
and raced subjects, rendering them imperfect representatives of sex-discrimination claims.22 Underscoring this point, the case Moore v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc.
rejected a Black woman’s attempt to certify a class of plaintiffs that included
white women because the Black female plaintiff “had never claimed that she was

19.

Id. at 143.
Crenshaw, Demarginalizing, supra note 8, at 139-40 (describing the “single-axis” analysis and
problems with the approach).
21. DeGraffenreid, 413 F. Supp. at 144.
22. The court dismissed the racism cause of action and recommended that it be consolidated with
another race discrimination lawsuit against General Motors that did not raise concerns about
compound discrimination. Id. at 145.
20.
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discriminated against as a female, but only as a [B]lack female.”23 What the court
was really saying was that the Black female plaintiff had never claimed that she
was discriminated against as a white female, but only as a Black female. As Demarginalizing argued,
For white women claiming sex discrimination is simply a statement that
but for gender, they would not have been disadvantaged. For them there
is no need to specify discrimination as white females because their race
does not contribute to the disadvantage for which they seek redress. The
view of discrimination that is derived from this grounding takes race
privilege as a given.24
In other words, a white female plaintiff would not have to “worry about being ‘only’ a white woman over and against some more generalizable female subjectivity.”25 Her white female identity functioned not as “a particularity of gender
but gender itself.”26
If we are right that the courts’ preference for formulating a sex-discrimination claim “as a female” might be rearticulated to mean “as a white female,” but
not “as a [B]lack female,” then the courts’ approach was decidedly not race neutral. It is an example of how whiteness can operate as an invisible baseline for
gender in ways that privilege white women. As Section I.B discusses, this
baselining of whiteness is at play in Justice Powell’s Bakke concurrence as well.
B. An Intersectional Reading of an Overlooked Passage
Our intersectional engagement of Justice Powell’s Bakke concurrence begins
with the following passage:
Nor is petitioner’s view as to the applicable standard supported by the
fact that gender-based classiﬁcations are not subjected to this level of
scrutiny. Gender-based distinctions are less likely to create the analytical
and practical problems present in preferential programs premised on racial or ethnic criteria. With respect to gender there are only two possible
classiﬁcations. The incidence of the burdens imposed by preferential
classiﬁcations is clear. There are no rival groups which can claim that
they, too, are entitled to preferential treatment. Classwide questions as

23.

Moore v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 708 F.2d 475, 480 (9th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added).
24. Crenshaw, Demarginalizing, supra note 8, at 144-45.
25. Carbado, supra note 17, at 822 (advancing this claim with respect to a white female litigant in
a different antidiscrimination case).
26. Id.
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to the group suffering previous injury and groups which fairly can be
burdened are relatively manageable for reviewing courts. The resolution
of these same questions in the context of racial and ethnic preferences
presents far more complex and intractable problems than gender-based
classiﬁcations. More importantly, the perception of racial classiﬁcations
as inherently odious stems from a lengthy and tragic history that genderbased classiﬁcations do not share. In sum, the Court has never viewed
such classiﬁcation as inherently suspect or as comparable to racial or ethnic classiﬁcations for the purpose of equal protection analysis.27
As we stated in the Introduction, scholars have largely overlooked the race
and gender logics on which this passage rests.28 We interrogate those logics here
not just because they reveal Justice Powell’s rudimentary understanding of race
and gender, but also because Justice Powell’s conceptualization of race and gender reﬂected and shaped the conceptual infrastructure on which tiers-of-scrutiny
analyses are grounded.29 Moreover, the race and gender thinking that descriptively and normatively anchors the passage transcends equal-protection doctrine
and likely explains why, across doctrinal regimes, Black women have historically
been “impossible subjects”30 in antidiscrimination law. That is to say, judges
have pushed Black women’s social disadvantages and vulnerabilities beyond the
boundaries of legal remediation.
We begin with Justice Powell’s assertion that “the perception of racial classiﬁcations as inherently odious stems from a lengthy and tragic history that gender-based classiﬁcations do not share.” This reﬂects what one of us has called an
“intersectional failure” in at least two respects.31 First, the claim ignores the fact
that slavery and Jim Crow—both of which presumably are part of the “lengthy
and tragic history” to which he refers—were gendered in ways that shaped how
Black women experienced themselves as women.32 Implicit in Justice Powell’s account is the view that what happened to Black women in the context of Jim Crow
27.
28.
29.
30.

31.
32.

Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 302-03 (1978) (Powell, J., writing for the
Court) (citations omitted).
See supra note 7.
It is beyond the scope of this Essay to challenge Justice Powell’s two-sex theory of sex. We
would be remiss, however, not to note that we think it is deeply ﬂawed.
Cf. MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA 4-5 (2004) (describing undocumented persons as “impossible subject[s]” because their
“inclusion within the nation was simultaneously a social reality and a legal impossibility”
barred from rights).
Crenshaw, From Private Violence, supra note 17, at 1457.
See, e.g., ANGELA DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE & CLASS 23 (1981) (“[I]t is important to remember
that the punishment inﬂicted on women exceeded in intensity the punishment suffered by
their men, for women were not only whipped and mutilated, they were also raped.”).
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and slavery was not gendered or, alternatively, that the gendered dimensions of
slavery were somehow distinguishable. His analysis obscures that slavery and
Jim Crow were constituted through regimes of both race and sex. This obfuscation strips Black women of their female identity and banishes their experiences
from constitutionally relevant narratives of gender inequality. In sum, Justice
Powell failed to see that race and gender are intersectional social forces. It is precisely this intersectionality that explains both the racialized sexual violence Black
women endured during slavery (including the sexual exploitation of Black
women’s bodies to produce a “peculiar”33 kind of property—Black slaves),34 and
the racialized domesticity Black women experienced under Jim Crow (including
their economic exploitation as caregivers and domestic workers).35
Another reason Justice Powell’s analysis might be described as an intersectional failure is that it reﬂects the view that Black women’s experiences do not
(and presumably cannot) stand in for or represent the category of women per
se. He seems to suggest that gender discrimination is that which disadvantages
or limits the opportunities of white women. Underwriting Justice Powell’s reasoning is the idea that because slavery and Jim Crow did not happen to white
women, neither can be understood as subordinating regimes that impact the
lives of women. Borrowing from a classic Black feminist text, in Justice Powell’s
analysis, “all the women are white.”36
Something akin to an “intrafemale separate sphere” ideology is at play here.
Unlike the traditional separate-spheres ideology, which policed the boundaries
of the public and private in ways that made the home the “natural” place for
women,37 the intrafemale separate sphere polices the boundaries of female identity in ways that make white women the “natural” embodiment of women. Under this logic, Black women’s experiences cannot stand in for women’s

33.
34.

35.

36.
37.

See KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH
3 (1956).
See, e.g., Emily West & R.J. Knight, Mothers’ Milk: Slavery, Wet-Nursing, and Black and White
Women in the Antebellum South, 83 J. SOUTHERN HIST. 37, 37 (2017) (“[W]hite women used
wet-nursing as a tool to manipulate enslaved women’s motherhood for slaveholders’ own
ends.”).
See, e.g., Kali Nicole Gross, African American Women, Mass Incarceration, and the Politics of Protection, 102 J. AM. HIST. 25, 27-28 (2015); Katherine van Wormer et al., What We Can Learn of
History from Older African American Women Who Worked as Maids in the Deep South, 37 WESTERN J. BLACK STUD. 227, 232 (2013).
ALL THE WOMEN ARE WHITE, ALL THE BLACKS ARE MEN, BUT SOME OF US ARE BRAVE: BLACK
WOMEN’S STUDIES (Akasha (Gloria T.) Hull, Patricia Bell Scott & Barbara Smith eds., 1982).
See Andrea L. Miller, Note, The Separate Spheres Ideology: An Improved Empirical and Litigation
Approach to Family Responsibilities Discrimination, 99 MINN. L. REV. 343, 344 (2014); Reva B.
Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman’s Rights Claims Concerning Wives’ Household Labor,
1850-1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073, 1093-94 (1994).
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experiences because Black women cannot stand in for white women. Because
white women’s experiences deﬁne the boundaries of gender in Justice Powell’s
analysis, the gendered dimensions of Black women’s “lengthy and tragic history”
are, constitutionally speaking, illegible. His reasoning consigns Black women to
a separate sphere in which their race undermines their claim to a female identity.
Of course, at no point does Justice Powell expressly say that white women
are “real” women and Black women are not. But his claim that women have not
experienced a “lengthy and tragic history” of discrimination analogous to slavery
and Jim Crow is based on one of two assumptions (or both): (1) that slavery and
Jim Crow did not marginalize Black women and (2) that evidence of women’s
marginalization resides outside the “lengthy and tragic history” of racial discrimination. These assumptions, separately and together, effectively make white
women the “proper” subjects of gender. In short, Justice Powell’s analysis
searches for gender inequality outside of the two signiﬁcant racial regimes in
which Black women experienced it: slavery and Jim Crow. It is as if, in assessing
the historical realities of gender, Justice Powell is thinking about Scarlett O’Hara
rather than Sojourner Truth.38 He centers white women’s experiences and makes
them the baseline against which gender inequality is constitutionally legible or
not.
Justice Powell’s gender analysis is an example of what one of us has called
“colorblind intersectionality.”39 By colorblind intersectionality we mean “instances in which whiteness helps to produce and is part of a cognizable social
category but is invisible or unarticulated as an intersectional subject position.”40
Expressed slightly differently, colorblind intersectionality makes whiteness an
unstated baseline for gender, rather than a modiﬁer of it. Thus, anytime a court
speaks in terms of women but is really referring to white women, it is engaging
in colorblind intersectionality.
Justice Powell’s concurrence reﬂects colorblind intersectionality. Though he
purports to make a claim about gender qua gender, the woman at the center of
his analysis, who has not experienced “the lengthy and tragic history” of racial
subordination, is clearly white. Because in Justice Powell’s opinion whiteness
operates invisibly as the default on which he articulates his views about gender
inequality, the racial dimensions of his claims about gender are both incorporated (in that whiteness anchors his race and gender analysis) and

38.

See Ray McAllister, The Southern Gentleman, 74 AM. BAR ASS’N J. 48, 48 (1988) (highlighting
Justice Powell as a “quintessential” Southern gentleman).
39. Carbado, supra note 17, at 817.
40. Id.
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unincorporated (in that whiteness is not formally expressed as an intersectional
feature of gender).41
None of this means that we endorse Justice Powell’s view that white women
have not experienced a “lengthy and tragic history” of subordination. As thenprofessor Ruth Bader Ginsburg observed, commenting on Bakke, the Supreme
Court’s prior gender-discrimination cases contradicted the claim that sex discrimination in the United States was neither “lengthy” nor “tragic.”42 Consider,
for example, Frontiero v. Richardson.43 The case centered on the constitutionality
of a statute that made female spouses of male members of the military dependents for purposes of receiving housing and medical beneﬁts, but required male
spouses of female military personnel to prove their dependency.44 Justice Brennan, writing for a plurality of the Court, subjected the statute to strict scrutiny
and argued that it was unconstitutional. In doing so, Justice Brennan expressly
discussed the historical subordination of women. “There can be no doubt that
our Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination,” he
wrote.45 “Traditionally, such discrimination was rationalized by an attitude of
‘romantic paternalism’ which, in practical effect, put women, not on a pedestal,
but in a cage.”46 Justice Brennan then went on to analogize discrimination
against women to discrimination against African Americans,47 observing that
our statute books gradually became laden with gross, stereotyped distinctions between the sexes and, indeed, throughout much of the 19th
century the position of women in our society was, in many respects, comparable to that of [B]lacks under the pre-Civil War slave codes. Neither
slaves nor women could hold office, serve on juries, or bring suit in their
own names, and married women traditionally were denied the legal capacity to hold or convey property or to serve as legal guardians of their
own children. And although [B]lacks were guaranteed the right to vote
in 1870, women were denied even that right—which is itself “preservative

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 823 (describing this dynamic with respect to Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d.
1076 (9th Cir. 2004)).
Serena Mayeri, Reconstructing the Race-Sex Analogy, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1789, 1837 (2008).
411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973).
Id. at 678, 688.
Id. at 684.
Id.
Importantly, Black feminist Pauli Murray conceived of the litigation strategy to analogize sex
discrimination to race discrimination. Unlike most deployments of that analogy, hers reﬂected
an intersectional sensibility in the sense of centering Black women. Serena Mayeri, Pauli Murray and the Twentieth-Century Quest for Legal and Social Equality, 2 IND. J.L. & SOC. EQUALITY
80, 83 (2014).
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of other basic civil and political rights”—until adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment half a century later.48
We highlight Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion in Frontiero because it is one
indication that Justice Powell likely understood that his claim that “gender-based
classiﬁcations” were not rooted in a “lengthy and tragic history” was contestable.49
Justice Brennan’s plurality is noteworthy in another sense too. It, like Justice
Powell’s Bakke concurrence, reﬂects intersectional erasures. In Justice Brennan’s
observation that “although [B]lacks were guaranteed the right to vote in 1870,
women were denied even that right,”50 the “Blacks” are clearly men. Black
women were not granted the right to vote in 1870. Justice Brennan’s “race” analysis thus clearly excluded Black women’s historical relationship to the right to
vote. Moreover, the “pedestal-as-cage” metaphor that, at least in part, underwrites Justice Brennan’s views that strict scrutiny should apply to gender-based
classiﬁcations does not capture Black women’s historical vulnerability as women.
For the most part, “romantic paternalism” was not the ideological foundation on
which the subordination of Black women rested. Not quite not women,51 Black
women were largely excluded from the “separate sphere” that was the hallmark
of romantic paternalism. Thus, while Justice Powell rejected race-sex analogies
and Justice Brennan embraced them, both moves effectuated intersectional erasures, articulated women’s experiences through the prism of whiteness, and made
white women the representative “women” of equal-protection law.
We note parenthetically that Justice Powell’s rejection of race-gender analogies foreclosed not only reasoning from gender to race; it also foreclosed reasoning from race to gender. This limited the application of strict scrutiny from
equal-protection race cases to invidious uses of gender (such as the statutory
regime at issue in Frontiero) and limited the application of intermediate scrutiny
from equal-protection gender cases to benign uses of race (such as the

48.

Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 685 (citations omitted).
49. According to Serena Mayeri, Justice Powell’s views on gender in Bakke were part of a broader
normative project to question race-sex analogies. Mayeri, supra note 42, at 1834-36. While
Justice Powell did not articulate his investment in that project in his Frontiero concurrence, he
did object to ceding any doctrinal credibility to the analogy in a letter to Justice Brennan,
arguing that there was “no analogy between the type of ‘discrimination’ which the [B]lack
race suffered and that now asserted with respect to women. The history, motivation and results—in almost all aspects of the problem—were totally different.” Id. at 1834 (quoting Letter
from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. 2 (Mar. 1, 1973) (on ﬁle with
the Washington and Lee University School of Law)).
50. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 685.
51. For an articulation of the “not quite not” articulation in the racial context, see SHARMILA SEN,
NOT QUITE NOT WHITE: LOSING AND FINDING RACE IN AMERICA (2018).
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affirmative-action policy implicated in Bakke).52 In this respect, Justice Powell
circumscribed the scope of equal-protection remediation for both race- and sexdiscrimination claims.53
This is a good place to bring Black women back into focus. We do so to consider how, if at all, Justice Powell’s analysis would have changed if Black women
had the representational currency to function as women. Before answering that
question, it is helpful to reprise two important doctrinal foundations on which
his concurrence rests. The ﬁrst implicates race ostensibly unmodiﬁed by gender—namely, that any use of race is constitutionally suspect.54 Accordingly, any
time the government relies on race, even for benign or remedial purposes, courts
should apply strict scrutiny.55 The second doctrinal feature is more implicit. It
trades on a point of law that Bakke inherits and implicates gender ostensibly unmodiﬁed by race—namely, that gender-based classiﬁcations are quasi-suspect.
Accordingly, anytime the government relies on gender, even for invidious or pernicious purposes, courts should apply the less onerous intermediate scrutiny
standard of review.56
To borrow from Anna Julia Cooper,57 where and when do Black women enter
the tiers-of-scrutiny landscape? Are policies that focus on Black women a suspect
classiﬁcation (because Black women are Black) or a quasi-suspect classiﬁcation
(because Black women are women)? Had Black women’s experiences ﬁgured as
women’s experiences in Justice Powell’s analysis, he would have been forced to
confront the fact that their identity implicates both strict and intermediate scrutiny. Justice Powell did not have to engage this doctrinal tension because his
colorblind intersectionality made Black women illegible as women. This illegibility is part of a broader representational position, whereby Black women’s race
either overdetermines their gender (Black women are Black people, not women)
or overly particularizes it (Black women are Black women, not women). Both
52.

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Mayeri makes a similar point, noting that “Powell’s opinion rejected not merely the applicability of the less stringent standard of review developed in the sex equality to race cases. He
also sidelined a more capacious conceptualization of discrimination’s meaning, effects, and
remediation.” SERENA MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND THE CIVIL
RIGHTS REVOLUTION 130 (2011).
See id. at 129 (noting that “[j]ust as [Powell] had resisted reasoning from race in earlier cases,
Powell rejected reasoning from sex in Bakke”).
See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291-94, 305 (1978).
See id. at 305-07.
See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976).
PAULA GIDDINGS, WHEN AND WHERE I ENTER: THE IMPACT OF BLACK WOMEN ON RACE AND
SEX IN AMERICA 13 (1984) (quoting Anna Julia Cooper) (“Only the BLACK WOMAN can say
‘when and where I enter, in the quiet, undisputed dignity of my womanhood, without violence and without suing or special patronage, then and there the whole . . . race enters with
me.’”).
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problems limit the ability of Black women’s experiences to stand in for those of
women.58
Part II builds on these intersectional insights and expressly performs the race
and gender analyses that Justice Powell’s concurrence avoids. Here, we explore
how equal-protection jurisprudence should process affirmative-action programs
that intersectionally target race and gender, and discuss the implications of our
analysis for the tiers-of-scrutiny framework more generally.
ii. black women and tiers of scrutiny
This Part situates intersectionality in the context of a doctrinal discussion
about tiers of scrutiny. We engage a tension between the fact that tiers of scrutiny
are structured around disaggregated articulations of identity—race or gender or
sexual orientation, with each triggering a different level of scrutiny—and the fact
that people’s existential realities are structured by intersecting regimes of
power—for example, racism and sexism and homophobia.59 In addition to raising difficult normative and doctrinal questions, this tension reveals the subtle
but signiﬁcant ways in which whiteness operates as an invisible baseline across
tiers of scrutiny.
Our starting point is a hypothetical. Assume that a university history department establishes a gender-studies curriculum and seeks to hire faculty in this
area. The department is especially interested in historians whose work reﬂects
an intersectional sensibility. The department is also hoping to use this chance to
diversify the representation of women on the school-wide faculty. Currently, the
faculty is thirty percent women, almost all of whom are white. The department
is hoping that structuring a search around people whose scholarship draws on
intersectionality will increase the representation of women of color in the pool.
The department chair thinks this is a good idea but also encourages her colleagues to intersectionalize their affirmative-action efforts by taking applicants’
race and gender into account.

58.

One could make a similar point about white women, but given the historical normalization of
whiteness within articulations of womanhood, we are not at all conﬁdent that an explicit articulation of white women’s race would have produced the kind of intersectional engagement
with tiers of scrutiny that we think is warranted.
59. We are not saying identities are additive. The fact is there is no easy way to communicate the
point that identities are co-constitutive. See Carbado, supra note 17, at 816 (“The strictures of
language require us to invoke race, gender, sexual orientation, and other categories one discursive moment at a time.”); see also Crenshaw, Demarginalizing, supra note 8, at 140 (“Because
the intersectional experience is greater than the sum of racism and sexism, any analysis that
does not take intersectionality into account cannot sufficiently address the particular manner
in which Black women are subordinated.”).
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After some debate, the department adopts the chair’s proposal and their
search concludes with the hire of a well-qualiﬁed Black woman who many on
the faculty described as a “star” in her ﬁeld. An unsuccessful applicant organizes
a lawsuit against the university. His claim is that the department’s intersectional
affirmative-action policy violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The court adjudicating the case has to decide the standard of review. Which tier of scrutiny should it apply? Strict? Intermediate? Something
else?
On one view—not ours—the answer is clearly strict scrutiny. Notwithstanding the applicability of intermediate scrutiny to gender-targeted programs,60
strict scrutiny should apply because, for the purposes of constitutional analysis,
Black women here are Black, not women. To appreciate the wider reasoning of
this perspective, imagine that, instead of structuring its affirmative-action program around race and gender, the department focused on race and geography.
The department’s reliance on geography would not negate the application of
strict scrutiny, the argument might run, because the race-as-one-factor-amongmany rule that forms a core part of Justice Powell’s concurrence in Bakke contemplates that universities will incorporate factors other than race into their selection decisions.61 Under this argument, if an affirmative-action plan that combines race and geography triggers strict scrutiny, a race-and-gender plan should
as well. Indeed, race plus anything at all should trigger strict scrutiny. Any other
approach would create an end-run around the race per se rule on which strict
scrutiny is based.
On another view, which we ﬁnd more appealing, intermediate scrutiny
should apply. Black women lag behind white women with respect to many dimensions of social wellbeing, including income,62 health,63 educational

60.

See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317 (1978).
62. See Ariane Hegewisch & Heidi Hartmann, The Gender Wage Gap: 2018 Earnings Differences by
Race and Ethnicity, INST. FOR WOMEN’S POL’Y RES. (Mar. 7, 2019), https://iwpr.org
/publications/gender-wage-gap-2018 [https://perma.cc/Y8EU-2Z3K] (showing that white
women earn on average $817 per week, compared to Black women, who make $654).
63. See Why Are Black Women at Such High Risk of Dying from Pregnancy Complications?, AM.
HEART ASS’N (Feb. 20, 2019), https://www.heart.org/en/news/2019/02/20/why-are-black
-women-at-such-high-risk-of-dying-from-pregnancy-complications
[https://perma.cc
/8PLK-USYC] (highlighting that Black women are “three to four times more likely to die
from pregnancy-related causes than white women”).
61.
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attainment,64 professional status,65 and wealth.66 As a class, Black women are not
as well-positioned as white women to take advantage of the employment opportunities that colorblind gender-based affirmative-action policies afford. In this
respect, colorblind gender-based affirmative-action policies are not racially neutral; they are more likely to beneﬁt white women. Race-conscious gender-based
affirmative action is a way to offset that advantage and level the gender-equality
remedial landscape.
There is no principled reason why courts should treat affirmative-action policies that are more likely to beneﬁt Black women more stringently than those
that are more likely to beneﬁt white women. Subjecting the latter to intermediate
scrutiny and the former to strict scrutiny is to apply different equal-protection
standards for Black and white women. Such disparate doctrinal treatment could
have broader institutional effects. Because race-conscious affirmative action
would be more vulnerable to constitutional challenge than its colorblind counterparts, employers would be more inclined to implement the latter. Additionally, applying strict scrutiny to race-conscious, gender-based affirmative-action
policies sends a social message that policies designed to address the marginalization of Black women are more “suspect” than those that are more beneﬁcial to
white women. The foregoing reasons are why we argue that courts should apply
intermediate (not strict) scrutiny to race-conscious, gender-based affirmative
action.67
We recognize that judges presented with a race-conscious, gender-based afﬁrmative-action policy would not be limited to intermediate- or strict-scrutiny
review. Setting aside rational-basis review, another doctrinal pathway exists. A
court could conclude that, because race triggers strict scrutiny and gender triggers intermediate scrutiny, the doctrinal framework should “compound” those
two regimes into a standard of review we might call “strict scrutiny with more

64.

See Ben Miller, The Good and Bad News in College Attainment Trends, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS
(Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/education-postsecondary/news
/2018/04/18/449758/good-bad-news-college-attainment-trends
[https://perma.cc/4YP8
-VFYX] (reporting that 60.5% of white women aged twenty-ﬁve to thirty-four have earned
postsecondary degrees, compared to 37.9% of Black women).
65. See Women in the Workplace 2018, MCKINSEY & CO. 9 (2019), https://womenintheworkplace
.com/Women_in_the_Workplace_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/F97H-7S6D] (showing that
for every 100 men who promoted to managerial positions, eighty-four white women and only
sixty Black women are similarly promoted).
66. See Racial Wealth Divide Snapshot: Women and the Racial Wealth Divide, PROSPERITY NOW
(Mar. 29, 2018), https://prosperitynow.org/blog/racial-wealth-divide-snapshot-women
-and-racial-wealth-divide [https://perma.cc/Z7V5-FGVV] (discussing how single white
women have a median wealth of $15,640, compared to $200 for single Black women).
67. See infra text accompanying notes 73-76 (discussing the limitations of our approach).
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bite” or “strict scrutiny-plus.” For several reasons, such an approach would be
unsatisfying.
First, this additive approach reproduces the very problematic analysis of the
“single-axis” thinking in law that intersectional analysis seeks to contest. In the
same way that Black women’s experiences are not simply the sum total of white
women’s and Black men’s, remedial interventions that target Black women
should not simply be the sum total of the tier of scrutiny for race (ostensibly sans
gender) plus the tier of scrutiny for gender (ostensibly sans race). The argument
in Demarginalizing that rejected the framing of Black women’s vulnerability to
discrimination as an added gloss on what happens to Black men or white women
can be redeployed here to challenge an additive approach to the doctrinal rules
on remedial efforts that target Black women.
Second, under the additive approach, while the intersection of femaleness
and whiteness would trigger intermediate scrutiny, the intersection of femaleness and Blackness would trigger “strict scrutiny-plus.” This outcome would authorize a hierarchical racialization of gender, through which Black women become “super suspect” as remedial subjects while white women remain only
“quasi suspect.” This “super suspect” status would further distance Black
women from white women in their capacity to access antidiscrimination countermeasures like affirmative action. It would once again legitimize the view that
the dimensions of patriarchy that justify societal resources are those faced by
women whose narratives of gender disadvantage courts and policymakers understand and articulate without the express reference to race. Put another way, a
“super suspect” status formalizes the troubling dicta in the Title VII cases we
mentioned earlier. In these cases, courts framed Black women’s appeals for protection from compound discrimination as preferential treatment. More troubling still, formalizing that dicta would itself constitute intersectional discrimination in the application of legal doctrine. Under the additive approach, it is not
the intersection of race and gender per se that would trigger “strict scrutinyplus,” but the intersection of Blackness and female identity.
Finally, “strict scrutiny-plus” likely would be “strict in theory and fatal in
fact.”68 As such, it would place Black women in a doctrinal category effectively
beyond remediation, creating an equal-protection landscape in which less vulnerable women would receive the most remedial attention.
Our observations about the compromised position of Black women under
the tiers-of-scrutiny framework take us back to one of the problems
68.

There are debates about whether strict scrutiny is strict in theory and fatal in fact. See, e.g.,
Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the
Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 795 (2006) (using empirical analysis to show that “context matters”). Our point is that likely no such controversy would exist with super-strict scrutiny.
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intersectionality was initially mobilized to address.69 Some courts interpreted Title VII’s prohibition against sex discrimination roughly to include only discrimination claims asserted by women that did not also expressly reference race.70 To
be cognizable, gender-based discrimination claims had to be colorblind. But as
we have tried to demonstrate, this approach is not racially neutral. It relies on
the fact that white women do not have to specify their race to name their gender
vulnerability and marginalization. Against the backdrop of that colorblind intersectionality, courts framed Black women’s explicit reference to race when asserting gender-based discrimination claims as a demand for preferential treatment.71
Our worry is that a version of this perception of preferential treatment could
manifest itself in affirmative-action jurisprudence. That is, courts could conclude that affirmative-action plans that expressly take race and gender into account operate as racial preferences for Black women or other women of color,
triggering strict scrutiny. Such a view obscures how colorblind gender-based afﬁrmative-action policies are themselves intersectional projects that can function
as unmarked racial preferences for white women.72
In some ways, our effort in the preceding discussion to apply the tiers-ofscrutiny framework to level the equal-protection playing ﬁeld for Black women
does not sufficiently challenge the fact that the tiers-of-scrutiny regime is fundamentally at odds with how power functions. A critical feature of the tiers-ofscrutiny architecture is that courts should subject particular social categories to
particular levels of review: strict scrutiny for race; intermediate scrutiny for gender; and rational basis for sexual orientation. The theory of intersectionality
stands in opposition to that idea.

69.

See Crenshaw, Demarginalizing, supra note 8, at 150-52.
70. Id.
71. For example, in Demarginalizing, Crenshaw highlights when Black women tried to bring a
case of discrimination based on their sex and race. The court reasoned:
The legislative history surrounding Title VII does not indicate that the goal of the
statute was to create a new classiﬁcation of “[B]lack women” who would have
greater standing than, for example, a [B]lack male. The prospect of the creation of
new classes of protected minorities, governed only by the mathematical principles
of permutation and combination, clearly raises the prospect of opening the hackneyed Pandora’s box.
Crenshaw, Demarginalizing, supra note 8, at 142 (citing DeGraffenreid v. General Motors, 413
F. Supp. 142, 145 (E.D. Mo. 1976)).
72. Note that the story we have told about race and gender and affirmative action can advance a
similar point about affirmative action based on race, gender, and sexual orientation. The application of strict scrutiny rather than rational basis to race-based affirmative-action efforts
that target LGBTQ+ individuals would place LGBTQ+ people of color in a worse remedial
position than members of that community who are white.
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We are not saying, to be clear, that there are no moments in which Black
women think of themselves as women or as Black people without further particularity.73 There are indeed such moments, and they are necessary both for community-building and for political organizing and resistance.74 Our worry is that
the tiers-of-scrutiny approach legitimizes the existential predicament about
which Audre Lorde so powerfully wrote:
As a Black lesbian feminist comfortable with the many different ingredients of my identity, and a woman committed to racial and social freedom
from oppression, I ﬁnd I am constantly being encouraged to pluck out
some one aspect of myself and present this as the meaningful whole,
eclipsing or denying the other parts of self.75
The tiers-of-scrutiny regime invites precisely the plucking away at identity that
Lorde describes—and not just at the individual level,76 but also at the level of
institutional governance. For example, a college or university that wants a court
to subject its gender-targeted affirmative-action policy to intermediate scrutiny
rather than strict scrutiny has every incentive to “pluck” race out of that policy
and present it as formally colorblind. This might explain why we are unaware of
a single affirmative-action policy, from any institutional setting, that expressly
takes Black women’s race and gender into account. In this regard, Black women
are invisible as subjects of remedial concern not only on the pages of Justice Powell’s opinion but also in the institutional policy-making spaces where affirmative-action initiatives are developed. In those contexts as well, colorblindness
works to “pluck” Black women’s experiences and antidiscrimination needs out
of gender-based affirmative-action plans.
Our modest proposal is that courts apply intermediate scrutiny to race-conscious gender-based affirmative-action policies. In advancing this approach, we
recognize that we are participating in the very regime of power we have been
73.

See Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, Intersectionality at 30: Mapping the Margins of AntiEssentialism, Intersectionality, and Dominance Theory, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2193, 2204 (2019) (“Intersectionality is not an argument against essentialism per se.”); Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN.
L. REV. 1241 (1991) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins].
74. Carbado & Harris, supra note 73 at 2197; see also Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins, supra note
73, at 1251-52 (explaining that intersectionality is a theory about coalition-building and that
race is itself a coalitional formation).
75. AUDRE LORDE, Age, Race, Class, and Sex: Women Redeﬁning Difference, in SISTER OUTSIDER 114,
120 (1984).
76. On the theory of identity negotiation, see Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity,
85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1263-67 (2000); see also DEVON W. CARBADO & MITU GULATI, ACTING WHITE?: RETHINKING RACE IN POST-RACIAL AMERICA (2013) (describing how racial minorities are judged on how they perform their race).
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contesting. We view our approach as a provisional strategy in the event that an
intersectional affirmative-action case comes before the courts. This “in the
meantime” strategy is precisely the approach many of us have found ourselves
adopting when defending the diversity rationale for affirmative action, even
though we believe that courts should not subject affirmative action to strict scrutiny, and that under strict scrutiny, there are stronger justiﬁcations for it (such
as combating societal discrimination). In other words, we articulate our intermediate scrutiny proposal under conditions of doctrinal constraint.
At the same time, it is not our view that eliminating tiers of scrutiny altogether in favor of a contextual approach that reviews governmental action for
subordination would necessarily solve the intersectional problems we have
raised. Though we are sympathetic to arguments that seek to abolish tiers of
scrutiny, our view is that this would not itself disrupt the hierarchical ordering
that makes some claims to equality more suspect than others. The problems this
Essay foregrounds in the formalistic interpretation of tiers of scrutiny also appears in Degraffenreid’s formalistic interpretation of the word “or” in Title VII’s
protected grounds of discrimination. The more fundamental problem is that
both doctrinal areas trade on either/or conceptualizations of power and identity
that create and obscure baselines against which African Americans in general and
Black women in particular are perceived to be suspect as people seeking justice.
Our challenge, then, does not merely confront legal standards and constitutional rules, but interrogates particular ways of conceptualizing race and gender
both within and beyond legal discourse. Advocates and stakeholders within discursive communities who are not bound by the constraints of such constitutional
rules routinely reproduce precisely the “single-axis” frameworks that privilege
and foreground group members whose narratives of injustice ﬁt the either/or
parameters of equality claims. If our own thinking and practice cannot transcend
hierarchical tiers, and if our social-justice interventions fail to address baselines
of privilege and power, then a mere shift in the articulation of the legal rules will
not move the justice needle in the “both/and” direction that the theory of intersectionality contemplates.
conclusion
Our purpose in this Essay was to revisit Demarginalizing and examine a passage in Justice Powell’s Bakke concurrence to which scholars have paid scant attention.77 By articulating racial and gender inequality as separate and apart from
each other, Justice Powell rendered Black women, juridically speaking, not quite
women and doubly suspect. They are suspect under strict scrutiny (because
77.

See Crenshaw, Demarginalizing, supra note 8.
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remedial efforts directed at Black people trigger strict scrutiny) and suspect as
beneﬁciaries of intermediate scrutiny (because they are not, like the women at
the center of Justice Powell’s analysis, white).
Interrogating how Black women ﬁgure into the Bakke passage raises broader
concerns about tiers-of-scrutiny and equal-protection doctrine. One concern is
whether, under existing doctrine, remedial projects that intersectionally target
race and gender should be subject to intermediate scrutiny rather than strict
scrutiny, as we argue they should. Another is whether equal-protection law is
already an intersectional project, albeit an unmarked one, that privileges the intersectional identities of white antidiscrimination claimants. Still a third concern
is that the core analytical structure of equal-protection doctrine (separate tiers of
scrutiny for separate dimensions of identity) sits in tension with the concept of
intersectionality. While we have engaged each of these issues and discussed the
implications of our analysis for equal-protection law, the ideas we have expressed
are decidedly provisional and intended to generate further debate. Such a debate
is warranted, we think, because three decades after the publication of Demarginalizing, equal-protection scholarship and teaching has yet to take an intersectional turn. We do not mean by this that scholars should take our view of the
intersectional issues this Essay describes. Rather, our modest invitation is to the
scholars, judges, and lawyers who routinely navigate an equal-protection landscape structured around compartmentalized tiers of power and identity: ask the
intersectionality question.
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